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1. Introduction. 
The world's largest shipping company, AP Moller-Maersk, operates in more than 135 countries 
around the world, employs 117,000 employees and controls over 16% of the global market with more than 
500 container vessels and 2.6 million TEU1 generating nearly US$ 60 billion in revenues. The group has 
established its dominance with fast growth fuelled by a series of mergers and acquisitions. In 2005, AP 
Moller-Maersk acquired Royal P&O Nedlloyd N.V. in a deal that added 156 container vessels and 13,000 
employees to the group.  In a long line of mergers, some of the largest deals are: TORM Lines in 2002, the 
containers division of Sea-Land Services Inc. in 1999 and the purchase of Safmarine Containers Lines (SCL) 
from Safmarine. The P&O Nedlloyd container line was itself previously another shipping giant that was 
created in 1997 by the merger of the container-shipping liner divisions of Royal Nedlloyd (Dutch) and P&O 
Containers (British). This level of rapid growth of the shipping companies through mergers and acquisitions 
is beyond the reach of organic expansion pathways and has shaped the maritime industry over the last 
thirty years. 
The shipping industry has experienced significant consolidation which has led to a notable increase in 
the level of concentration through mergers and acquisitions and an equally important process of 
integration is occurring among upstream and downstream transportation firms (Van de Voorde and 
Vaneslander, 2009). Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) are an important mechanism of fast growth used by 
shipping firms, which have lead to increased levels of consolidation and integration in the maritime sector 
(Cariou, 2008; Frémont, 2009). Little is known, however, about the shareholder wealth implications of 
these important decisions by shipping firms and their economic value effects.2 These corporate events are 
expected to produce price effects as investors respond to M&A announcements.3 
M&A deals are prominent in the maritime sector with over US $200 billion spent over the last thirty 
years on more than 4,100 deals and the opportunity to achieve large economies of scale among deep sea 
liners have forced periodic rationalisations (Heaver et al. 2000). A distinctive feature of the shipping sector 
is that both regulation and technology have major impacts on the operations of the constituent firms. 
While technological innovation and evolution allowed the construction of ever larger ships with higher 
economies of scale (note the new Maersk vessels at over 15,000 TEU), regulation has also progressed 
apace. In Europe, regulation initially exempted shipping from competition considerations though this is no 
longer the case (Cariou, 2008) and similar deregulatory considerations apply in the US following the 
introduction of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA, 1998) and its implementation by the Federal 
Maritime Commission. The processes of consolidation within the maritime sector and integration along 
                                                          
1  TEU: Twenty foot Equivalent Unit is a typical unit of shipping trade volume and 1 TEU denotes approximately one container. 
2  This is not surprising since the maritime sector has traditionally not been associated with extensive use of the financial markets 
for the raising of finance. The primary reasons are claimed to be mutual lack of knowledge and firms’ reluctance to operate 
with less than full personal control and the markets’ presumption of industrial instability in shipping (Stokes, 1996). 
3  Unlike the situation noted much earlier by Stokes (1996), Grammenos and Papapostolou (2012) report that in recent years, 
shipping firms are increasingly raising capital via IPOs and claim that shipping firms are now better known among institutional 
investors with increased analyst coverage. 
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globally networked supply chains noted above are, therefore, expected to continue and M&As are strategic 
means deployed in these processes (Van de Voorde and Vaneslander, 2009). The literature has, however, 
failed to supply global and comprehensive evidence of stock markets’ responses to maritime M&As. 
There are several reasons for studying M&As in the shipping industry. Firstly, most large shipping 
firms have recently embarked on M&As because the alternative option of growing organically is relatively 
slow given the need for global scope in shipping operations (Das 2011). Secondly, a closer examination of 
the maritime M&As is warranted due to their implications for the structure of companies, the level of 
competition in the maritime sector and the costs of transportation services on international trade. Thirdly, 
shipping firms are seeking, through M&As, increasing economies of scale both in larger ships and bigger 
fleets, as well as economies of scope in fleet composition, extended trade routes and market coverage. 
Fourthly, a new generation of ship owners who better understand the capital markets, are prospecting for 
growth opportunities through the raising of financing via equity markets and the pursuit of fast expansion 
via M&As (Merikas et al. 2009; Grammenos and Papapostolou, 2012). Furthermore, as Andreou et al. 
(2012) argue that one benefit of studying M&As by focussing on a single industry, such as shipping, is the 
mitigation of possible inter-industry variations. They note that studies that span several industries will 
report aggregate effects that potentially mask the performance variation across industries. 
Although there have been prior M&A studies in transportation, these have mostly been in the airline 
industry and they demonstrated that M&As can be strategic game changers.4 The maritime sector has 
generated only a limited literature on M&As from an equity market perspective. Previous studies in 
shipping do not provide comprehensive evidence and either employ unsatisfactorily small samples, are 
constrained by short sample periods, span few maritime sectors or restrict their investigations to specific 
countries and regions.5 Panayides and Gong (2002) study two mergers in the 'liners' shipping sector 
whereas Samitas and Kenourgios (2007) explore fifteen mergers in the 'trampers' shipping sector.  Andreou 
et al. (2012), investigated intermodal freight transportation but do not focus on shipping - only 30 to 48 
firms in their sample related to shipping - and report results that are specific to the US. Furthermore, other 
earlier studies have been mostly descriptive in nature and provide little market-based evidence that 
documents the equity markets' evaluation of shipping M&As (see Brooks and Ritchie 2006).  
In this light, several interesting questions remain unanswered and require investigation. Do the 
shareholders of acquirers and targets in maritime M&As experience positive wealth effects and do these 
effects vary by region and sector? What factors determine such wealth effects? Do these factors vary 
across Asian, European and North American firms and do they display sector-wise variations?6 For instance, 
                                                          
4  See Zhang and Aldridge (1997), on mergers; Gong, Firth and Cullinane (2008), for industry dynamics and stock market reactions; 
Merkert and Morrell (2012) examine optimal airline size and economies of scale. 
5  See for example, Midoro and Pitto (2000); Panayides and Gong (2002); Samitas and Kenourgios (2007). 
6  Simulation evidence of multi-port vs. hub and spoke port calls by container ships shows marked variation between N. America, 
Asia and Europe where multi-port calls with smaller ships lead to lower cost in most countries while hub and spoke port calls 
using mega-ships lead to lower cost in European container shipping (See, Imai et al., 2009). While we do not directly test for 
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does integration between two port operations firms affect market valuations similarly to integration 
between a port operator and a deep sea liner firm? In this context, this study has four objectives: firstly, to 
establish the wealth effects on shareholders of acquirer and target firms in shipping M&As; secondly, to 
investigate whether there are variations in the wealth effects across regions or sectors; thirdly, to 
determine which firm and deal characteristics can explain the announcement period wealth effects and 
finally to estimate the marginal effects of the factors driving the likelihood of shipping firms engaging in an 
M&A and whether these marginal effects vary across different regulatory regimes and regions.7  
Our study makes several contributions to the shipping transportation literature. Initially, the study 
includes all M&A announcements involving shipping firms, in contrast to the prior fragmented evidence, 
and examines all shipping sub-sectors, which provides generalizable findings. Country-specific studies suffer 
from potential biases arising from the effects of regulatory and legal constraints which restrict the scope of 
their conclusions. We avoid such bias by including M&As from all countries. Finally, evidence from studies 
covering a narrow span of years can be influenced by the transitory economic conditions of a particular 
period. Our study covers more than a quarter century of shipping M&As and we, therefore, document 
findings that are robust to variations prevalent in the economic environment. 
Secondly, the study explores the effects of M&As on both targets and acquirers in contrast to prior 
work which has largely focussed on acquirer firms. The contribution extends beyond measuring the wealth 
effects associated with M&As to investigating the economic dollar value effects on the shareholders of 
acquirers and targets and the net economic impact.8 We investigate these wealth effects for various 
strategies that have been employed by the managers of shipping firms. We examine differences in the 
gains from: cross-border versus domestic integration, focussing as opposed to diversifying integration, 
cash-financed compared to stock financed integration, private targets as compared to public, friendly 
mergers as opposed to mergers that are not, and finally we investigate the bargaining power of the parties 
involved. 
Thirdly, by including all shipping M&As we make our findings representative and generalizable and 
avoid the sample selection bias noted by Netter et al. (2010). They argue that previous large-sample studies 
of M&As, which selected samples through minimum deal-value thresholds, have inadvertently imposed a 
natural sample selection bias. Furthermore, studies often also exclude M&As that do not report deal 
values. The results of such studies are not representative of M&A activity and as Netter et al. (2010) 
conclude, these selection criteria have noticeably biased the results reported in prior studies. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
network architectures we argue that M&As that seek out such cost reductions are occurring across regions and they seek 
economies of scale and of scope and hence test for differences due to focus and diversification. 
7  Wealth effects are typically measured using Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) and the computation of CARs is described in 
detail in the methodology section. 
8  Economic dollar value effects are defined as the product of the cumulative abnormal return and the market value 
of the firm. We use the terms economic value and dollar value synonymously to distinguish announcement effects 
measured in dollar terms from return measures such as abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns. 
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Fourthly, the study examines the determinants of the wealth effects of M&A transactions, exploring 
variations in these determinants across three major maritime sectors and three major geographical regions. 
Among the determinants that we investigate are firm-specific characteristics, deal-specific characteristics 
and macroeconomic variables, such as: relative change in GDP per capita growth rates, measured at 
purchasing power parity; relative change in stock market performance; and, relative change in foreign 
currency exchange rates. 
Finally, using multinomial logit models, we examine how the determinants of the merger 
propensities differ across three periods of regulatory change in the shipping industry. The three periods 
explored are: the years prior to the passage of the OSRA (1998), which is classified as the deregulated 
period; the years after 2000 until the European Union (EU) repeal, in 2008, of the exemption from 
competition granted to the shipping industry, which we call the intervening period; and, the years after 
2008, which is classified as the regulated period.  
Our results show that shareholders of both target and acquirer firms experience positive wealth 
effects, at announcement. Abnormal returns for acquirers differ across sectors but not regions, whereas for 
targets abnormal returns differ across regions but not sectors.  Overall, shipping M&As create wealth, on 
average, irrespective of region and sector and while targets secure the bulk of the gains. The factors 
associated with wealth gains vary significantly across regions and sectors. For example, what creates wealth 
for port operators and cargo handlers is not what drives merger gains for deep sea liners. Integration 
among firms in Asia is driven by different factors as compared to integration among shipping firms in N. 
America or Europe. 
Section two discusses the relevant prior literature and hypotheses while section three describes the 
sample and the methodology followed by a discussion of the results in section four and a conclusion. 
2. Literature review and development of expectations. 
2.1. Shipping literature on mergers. 
There is evidence on alliances and conferences in liner-shipping specifically but little on M&As. 
Brooks and Richie (2006), focused on a description of shipping M&As, over the period 1996-2000 and 
reported that 40% of M&As were cross-border transactions. They also report that the shipping industry has 
experienced significant growth particularly through strategic and synergistic consolidation. This on-going 
process of consolidation, Frémont (2009) notes, shows no sign of abating and shipping firms are diversifying 
both away from their immediate sectors and into unrelated businesses. Brooks (2000) suggests that M&As 
in shipping, offer strategic advantages quite different from alliances but both create economic value. 
Though the shipping industry has been traditionally characterised by conferences and alliances, recent 
corporate responses suggest the tide is changing and M&A are becoming the favoured route to rapid 
growth (Das 2011). We argue that this new found impetus for M&As is a manifestation of synergy related 
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motives as noted in the general M&A literature: size-related economies of scale which yield operational 
efficiency in ships and fleets; and economies of scope associated with complementarities among 
subsidiaries in different shipping sectors (see Hirshleifer, 1993). 
Shipping companies, as Heaver et al., (2000) argue, are seeking to provide door-to-door integrated 
transportation services and are pursuing closer integration along the transportation chain, usually via 
M&As. Heaver et al. (2000) provide examples of majority and minority ownership by carrier firms in port 
and terminal companies, with the level of control achieved in the target being strategically important for 
the carriers. They conclude that bargaining power has shifted to such carrier firms and argue that the 
future of independent port and terminal companies is bleak. The last point implies that port and terminal 
companies are potential targets in future M&As and have an increased likelihood of being unable to 
bargain for high target valuations. Midoro and Pitto (2000) provide evidence that the liner industry has 
undergone consolidation and global strategic alliances have formed amongst leading carriers. They note 
that alliances are unworkable while M&As are the growth path preferred by shipping firms. Fusilo (2009) 
argues that recent regulatory reforms, such as the passage of OSRA in the US and the repeal by the EU of 
the exemption from competition, which have disrupted cooperative relationships among shipping firms in 
favour of competition, will lead to more M&As and to a further increase in market concentration. The 
limited extant literature helps guide us to the relevant issues in shipping and we expect the descriptive 
conclusions and the assessments noted in the shipping and associated transportation literature, to be 
corroborated with the assessments of the equity markets' responses documented in our study. 
An exploration of two M&As in the 'liner' shipping sector is reported in Panayides and Gong (2002) 
who conclude that M&As have a significant positive impact on the stock prices of liner companies.9 A 
similar exploratory study of fifteen M&As in the 'tramper' shipping sector is reported in Samitas and 
Kenourgios (2007), who report insignificant price impacts at announcement.10 These two studies are both 
limited by small sample sizes, which diminish the validity of the inferences that can be drawn from their 
findings and they do not have adequate bases on which to form inferences for the whole shipping industry. 
The question of how firms in the liner shipping industry choose between partnerships and acquisitions was 
investigated by Das (2011). Using a large sample of 427 firm-events, this study quantitatively examines this 
issue and concludes that liner shipping firms are more likely to acquire targets from their home 'region' - 
that is, they prefer domestic to cross-border M&As; additionally that prior acquisition experience increases 
the likelihood of acquisitions being selected as the mode of alliance (while former partnership experience 
                                                          
9  This is an inference that cannot reliably be made from a sample of two mergers. The very limited sample size, short time period, 
and the exclusive focus on two isolated mergers alone make it clearly inadvisable to generalise from it to all shipping M&As 
globally. They find, for example, that the event period abnormal returns are 115%. 
10  They report peculiar results of -20% for acquirers around the announcement from -2 to +2 (not typically seen in an M&A study) 
and bootstrapped z-statistics on the order of -0.003 for every window, which implies that results for abnormal returns of the 
order of -20% are insignificant. These two factors give us little confidence that they are reporting reliable results representative 
of the maritime sector. 
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of a firm decreases the chance of that firm choosing M&As); while, redundant resources increase the 
chances of selecting M&As as a method of expansion. Andreou et al. (2012) report results of an event study 
of vertical M&As by freight transporters in the US, covering road, rail and shipping firms. Though their focus 
is on freight transportation firms and not on shipping per se and they document positive gains for the 
acquirer and target firms for their aggregate sample from the freight sector, we cannot disentangle what 
the gains to US shipping firms might be. 
Qualitative studies in shipping M&As provide useful insights into industry dynamics, the distinctive 
features of deals and the typical characteristics of the firms involved while the few quantitative studies 
offer limited evidence on the wealth implications of shipping M&As, an exception being Andreou et al. 
2012. Although there is only sparse evidence on shipping M&As, there is an extensive general M&A 
literature which is reviewed elsewhere (see Andrade et al., 2001) with two reported stylized facts being 
that targets enjoy significant wealth gains whereas acquirers experience negligible effects. The majority of 
studies report small positive or negative and largely insignificant wealth gains for acquirers (see Bouwman 
et al. 2009; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996) though a few studies report significant losses for acquirers. More 
specifically, Moeller et al. (2005) report that US acquirers lost $240 billion from poor acquisitions over the 
period 1998-2001 in contrast to gains of $24 billion, for the period 1991-1997, and $4 billion during the 
1980s. Hostile takeovers generate higher target and typically higher bidder returns (Martin and McConnell, 
1991; Schwert, 2000). Acquirers of private targets earn significant abnormal returns around the 
announcement, in contrast to the small losses or insignificant gains of acquirers of public targets.11 The link 
between firm or deal characteristics and abnormal announcement returns for the acquirers has also been 
extensively studied. Acquirers with low managerial shareholding, large cash holdings, large capitalisation, 
low leverage and overconfident management as well as those pursuing hostile or conglomerate takeovers, 
or paying with stock, are the worst performers.12 
2.2. Theoretical expectations. 
Given the lack of a specific theoretical framework for shipping M&As, we draw upon the general 
M&A literature to form our expectations concerning the wealth effects to the shareholders of acquirers and 
targets. A number of theories have been proposed to explain the effects of M&A activity and a major 
concern of this literature is whether or not these events generate combined economic value. Weston et al., 
(2004) classify these theories as value-increasing, value neutral and value destroying. Value increasing 
theories predominantly argue along neoclassical lines that technology shocks and regulatory changes 
motivate M&As and these are seen as corporate responses in search of efficiency improvements and 
synergistic gains (see Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). Value neutrality is 
                                                          
11  See Chang (1998); Faccio et al., (2006); Moeller et al., (2005).  
12  See Chang (1998); Fuller et al., (2002); Harford (1999); Moeller et al., (2005); Morck et al., (1990) and Schwert (2000).  
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implied by the hubris hypothesis (Roll 1986). Value decreasing theories are associated with agency 
problems and managerial entrenchment (see Jensen, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). These theories posit 
conflicting predictions and empirical evidence has been employed to resolve them. Next, we further 
develop several expectations concerning M&As in shipping: Initially, we explore the operational costs and 
revenues in the maritime sector, as proxied by the Bunker Fuel Index and the Baltic Dry Index; subsequently 
we briefly describe the valuation effects associated with the announcement of M&As; furthermore, we 
discuss those deal characteristics that have been studied in the literature as driving the abnormal returns 
and finally, we describe the macroeconomic factors that influence the shareholder abnormal returns in 
shipping M&As. 
The maritime sector: 
Bunker Fuel Index: Van de Voorde and Vanelslander (2009) argue that M&As are conducted in the 
maritime industry primarily to achieve economies of scale and reduce operating costs. Bunkering and 
capital costs represent 25% to 33% of the operating costs of a ship, according to the Baltic Exchange (2013). 
To examine whether fuel costs impact the likelihood of M&As occurring, we proxy the cost of fuel with the 
Bunker Fuel Index. Increasing fuel prices reduces profit margins and forces firms to seek efficiency 
improvements. We, therefore, anticipate that changes in this index can proxy for the operating cost in 
shipping and should be positively associated with the likelihood of M&As. 
Baltic Dry Index: The Baltic Dry Index is a measure of the prevailing freight rates applicable to 
standard routes and typical bulk cargo in the maritime sector. The Baltic Exchange notes that there is a 
complex array of factors that affect the cost of transporting freight by sea: fleet supply, bunker prices, 
weather, industrial demand and choke points for sea-going traffic.13 These factors contribute to the risk 
exposure of shipping firms and M&As could be deployed to mitigate that risk. Furthermore, following the 
recent global economic downturn, firms in the maritime sector are expected to maximise their economies 
of scale by M&As (Quantrill, 2012). An increase in the Baltic Dry Index signals higher future revenues and 
hence profit margins, which will ease the pressure on firms to seek efficiency improvements. Consequently, 
we expect that changes in this index should be negatively associated with the likelihood of M&As. 
Announcement effects: 
Acquirer gains: The literature on shipping M&A is largely silent on the abnormal returns for acquirers 
although some indirect indication is reported by Andreou et al. (2012). In contrast, the M&A literature, in 
general, reports insignificant acquirer abnormal returns at announcement (Andrade et al. 2001). 
Nevertheless, Netter et al. (2010) report that the insignificant returns could be associated with the biased 
                                                          
13  Shipping trade traverses narrow lanes such as the Straits of Hormuz, Malacca, the narrow canals of the Suez and Panama and 
the Bosporus (The Baltic Exchange, 2013). 
 9 
sample selection procedures in prior studies, which have focussed on larger mergers. By studying a 
comprehensive worldwide sample of acquirers in the shipping industry, not restricted by any particular 
selection criteria except data requirements, our results should be an unbiased representation of the wealth 
effects attributable to acquirers in shipping M&As. Following the evidence reported in Andreou et al. (2012) 
we expect that shareholders of acquirer firms will realise positive announcement period abnormal returns. 
Target gains: The evidence concerning wealth effects to target shareholders is undisputed in the 
literature, since there is consensus and empirical studies report significant and large positive abnormal 
returns for targets (Andrade et al. 2001; Andreou et al. 2012). Target shareholders receive substantial 
premiums for relinquishing control to the acquirer. On this basis, we expect that the shareholders of targets 
will realise positive announcement period abnormal returns. 
Combined gains: Bhagat et al. (2005) provide empirical evidence confirming that combined wealth 
effects in M&As are positive and significantly larger than those implied by prior studies. Furthermore, 
Andreou et al. (2012) report combined wealth effects, measured by market value-weighted Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CARs), which are positive for freight transportation firms in the USA, where shipping is a 
sub sample. On this basis our expectation is that M&A announcements in shipping will result in wealth 
gains for acquirers and targets. 
Deal characteristics: 
Cross border vs. domestic: Cross-border mergers have been growing rapidly in volume but to date 
have not been investigated as extensively as domestic mergers. 14 Shipping firms may expand abroad to 
protect their relationship with globalising customers (Martin et al. 1998). Asymmetric information is less 
likely to be a problem in domestic compared with cross-border mergers because managers of acquiring 
firms have better quality information on domestic as compared to foreign targets. Acquirers taking over 
domestic firms are, therefore, less likely to overpay than when acquiring foreign targets. International 
expansion and entry into overseas markets via direct investment is highly risky and the preferred mode of 
entry in such cases is through strategic alliances and M&As. The acquirer seeking international expansion is 
often prepared to pay a market entry premium to acquire a suitable foreign target.  The target firm in a 
cross-border acquisition is, therefore, more likely to benefit from such entry premiums being extracted 
from the acquirer, than targets in domestic takeovers, which do not command similar premiums.   As a 
result, it is expected that the shareholders of the acquiring firm in a cross-border acquisition will realise 
lower abnormal returns than an acquiring firm in a domestic acquisition. 
                                                          
14  A cross-border M&A is defined as one where the acquirer and target firms are from different nations while domestic M&As are 
those deals where both acquirer and target are from the same nation. The nationalities of the firms are as listed in the SDC 
M&A database. 
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Focus vs. diversification: The OECD has reported that there are concerns about the increasing 
concentration within maritime sectors (see OECD-ITF Report by Van de Voorde and Vanelslander, 2009). 
Frémont (2009) reports that an on-going process of consolidation through M&As over the past 25 years has 
fuelled an increase in the level of concentration in the shipping industry from 40% in 1980 to over 80% in 
2007. Corporate diversification is wealth destroying and leads to a valuation discount, while focus-
increasing events have been argued to increase wealth (John and Ofek, 1995). 15 There is debate in the 
literature on the extent to which the strategies that firms adopt are contingent upon the arrival of positive 
or negative industry shocks (Coco and Mahrt-Smith, 2001). As competition has intensified over the last 30 
years, pressures to improve operational efficiencies have driven shipping firms to engage in extensive M&A 
activity seeking economies of scale.   Focus increasing deals, which enlarge the core operations, should 
allow acquirers to realize these scale economies. Shareholders of acquirer shipping firms, in acquisitions 
that increase focus, are expected to achieve higher abnormal returns than are shareholders in diversifying 
acquisitions. 
Private vs. public: As the maritime sector is populated by a significant number of private operators, 
expansion and consolidation within this sector will entail a large proportion of private target takeovers 
(Rodrigue, 2010). A number of theoretical arguments have been proposed in the literature to explain the 
observed higher gains realized by acquirers when taking over private as compared to public targets. Fuller 
et al. (2002) claim that private firms are less attractive to investors than similar firms listed on a stock 
exchange. This creates a lower valuation for such private firms compared to similar listed firms and the 
proportionate valuation difference is called a liquidity discount. Acquirers are, consequently, expected to 
secure lower valuations for the private as opposed to public targets. Faccio et al. (2006) suggest that 
acquirers that pay with stock to takeover closely held private targets could see the formation of 
blockholders in their ownership structure.  Such large blockholders formed in the acquirer following equity 
financed acquisitions will act as efficient monitors of the acquirer’s management. The effect of the 
emergence of such large blockholders is a higher valuation for the acquirer firm. Shareholders of acquirers 
taking over private targets should, therefore, be expected to achieve higher abnormal returns than when 
taking over public targets. 
Cash vs. stock: Acquisitions financed by cash, experience higher abnormal returns for both the 
acquirer’s and the target’s shareholders (Travlos, 1987). The rationale is that while cash is a risk-free 
payment, exchange of stock distributes risk between acquirers and targets and raises the possibility of a 
misvalued security being used as the means of payment. More importantly, from the perspective of 
shipping firms, the desire to maintain ownership concentration and prevailing levels of corporate control in 
                                                          
15  A focus-increasing M&A is defined as one where the acquirer and target firms are from the same sector and diversifying M&As 
are those deals where the acquirer and target are from different sectors. We use the 4-digit SIC codes of the firms as listed in 
the SDC M&A database. 
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the acquirer can also influence the choice of financing (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). Empirical evidence of 
public acquirers taking over public targets demonstrates that acquirers do not gain. Fuller et al. (2002), 
however, report that when public acquirers takeover private targets the shareholders of the acquirer 
realise positive abnormal returns. Specifically, they document that when acquirers takeover private targets 
and pay with stock they benefit more than when paying with cash. Since our sample of shipping M&As 
includes both public and private targets and in the light of the above discussion, we expect that 
shareholders of acquirer shipping firms involved in deals where stock is the means of payment will quite 
likely achieve higher abnormal returns than when cash is used. 
 Friendly vs. non-friendly: It is well established in the literature that hostile bids are very rare 
(Schwert, 2000). Given the prevalence of private operators in the maritime sector we do not anticipate a 
large number of hostile takeovers will ever materialise. While friendly deals are the most frequently 
observed events, many transactions are neither explicitly hostile nor friendly and are classed as neutral 
deals. Lower transactions costs and the potentially more effective post-acquisition integration associated 
with friendly deals support the expectation that acquirer shareholders are likely to gain more in friendly 
rather than neutral deals. By contrast, friendly deals can be motivated by hubris, so the acquirer is likely to 
overpay for the target and wealth will be transferred to the target’s shareholders, resulting in acquirer 
shareholders losses (Roll, 1986).  Such losses to acquirer shareholders when the deal attitude is friendly 
have been reported by Rau and Vermalean (1998). Given the contrasting evidence, whether the costs of 
managerial hubris dominate the benefits flowing from the lower transactions costs associated with friendly 
deals, becomes an empirical issue. 
Bargaining power: The balance of bargaining power between acquirer and target firms can 
determine the distribution of the potential gains from the merger. Relative size, defined as the ratio of 
market value of target to acquirer, proxies for the relative bargaining power of each party in an M&A (Fuller 
et al. 2002). Furthermore, several studies have explored the effect of the absolute size of the acquirer on 
shareholder wealth effects (Moeller et al. 2005). A larger acquirer will have more resources and be more 
experienced in negotiating the terms of a deal than targets who are typically smaller, hence bigger 
acquirers should command higher bargaining power. To investigate bargaining power we employ quartiles 
constructed both on the relative size (ratio of target market value to acquirer market value) and on the 
market capitalisation of the acquirer firm. 
Macroeconomic factors: 
The conditions of the economic environment affect the scale of international trade, much of which is 
carried via standard shipping channels, which have an impact on the level of activity in the shipping sector 
(Van de Voorde and Vaneslander, 2009). Given that shipping is a global industry and is driven by the 
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demands of international trade, macroeconomic factors such as, the level of economic activity, the stock 
market index in a country and the foreign exchange rate, can impinge on the prospects of the shipping 
sector. The influence of economy-wide factors on M&A activity is investigated by Erel et al. (2012) who 
specifically examine the valuation effects of foreign exchange rates and of stock markets. 
GDP: The GDP per capita is a measure of the total domestic production of goods and services. An 
increase in the GDP in our globalised economy will usually be reflected in increases in imports and exports 
with much of this volume of imports and exports being transported via sea-borne vessels. Growth in the 
GDP, therefore, will be indicative of increasing demand for shipping services. Consequently, a comparison 
of the growth rates in the GDP per capita between two countries will reflect the relative attractiveness of 
their respective shipping sectors. Shipping nations that figure prominently in terms of relative growth rates 
will be prime candidates for shipping firms to search for takeover targets. We measure GDP at purchasing 
power parity and converted into US $ and then calculate a relative GDP growth rate measure, denoted by 
GDPr as: 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑟 =
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟,𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟,𝑡−1
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡,𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡,𝑡−1
⁄         (1) 
Foreign Exchange (FX): Appreciation of the acquirer nation’s currency relative to that of the target’s 
nation makes it cheaper to acquire assets in the target’s nation. We, therefore, expect it is more likely that 
an acquirer will takeover a firm in a nation where the currency weakens relative to its home currency.  The 
foreign exchange rate for each country is measured using its exchange rate to the US$ and we construct a 
relative foreign exchange rate measure, denoted by FXr as: 
𝐹𝑋𝑟 =
𝐹𝑋𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡,𝑡
𝐹𝑋𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡,𝑡−1
𝐹𝑋𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟,𝑡
𝐹𝑋𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟,𝑡−1
⁄          (2) 
Market: A rise of the home stock market of a listed acquirer is expected to increase its valuation, 
making it more attractive to use its own higher valued stock to purchase firms in those nations where stock 
market indices have appreciated less.  An annual market return is calculated using the stock market index 
of a country and a relative market growth rate measure, denoted by RMarket, is then evaluated as: 
𝑅𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 =
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟,𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟,𝑡−1
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡,𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡,𝑡−1
⁄       (3) 
3. Data and methodology. 
3.1 Sample. 
Our sample includes all the merger and acquisition deals in the shipping industry available on the 
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database accessed through Thomson-Reuters. We do not impose any 
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restrictions other than requiring the acquirer to be a public listed company and have announcement dates 
for the deal, while target firms can be either public or private. These criteria result in 4,122 announced 
deals with a total value of over US $200 billion (see Figure 1). We collect share prices and relevant market 
and accounting data from Datastream International. Data unavailability reduces our initial sample to 2,036 
deals. 
[Please Insert Figure 1 About Here] 
To be included in the final sample, firms must have data on equity returns for the estimation and the 
event period. Data on the returns of each firm and the equity market index for the nation associated with 
each acquirer and each target firm are collected from Datastream. We also collect deal-specific information 
from SDC. All monetary values reported for each firm, in each M&A are converted to US$ at the US$/local 
currency exchange rate prevailing at the time of the announcement of the M&A. These criteria leave a final 
sample of 1,266 deals with bidders and targets listed in 67 different stock markets. The final sample is 
grouped geographically into four major regions. The majority of deals involve companies from Asia (524) 
and Europe (550) followed by North America (106) and all remaining deals are labelled as ‘others’ (86). The 
announcement dates in SDC are not manually cross-checked with hard-copy print sources to confirm the 
dates on SDC. Previous studies have verified that the announcement dates reported by SDC are accurate to 
the day over 90% of the time and to within two days, nearly 100% of the time (Netter et al. 2010). 
We form groups for broad geographic regions; major shipping sectors; cross-border or domestic 
aspect of deals; the focus-diversify nature of the deal; public or private status of the target; primary 
methods of payment; target control level achieved by acquirer; deal attitude; relative size quintiles and 
acquirer market value quintiles. Deal attitude is classified as friendly, neutral and as 'others', using 
information reported in the SDC M&A database. Unlike the evidence from general M&A studies, in our 
shipping sample, there are only five hostile deals that cannot be meaningfully analysed as a separate group. 
We, therefore, subsume these five deals into ‘others’. The 'others' group also comprises deals with a ‘not 
reported’ attitude.16 We then investigate the wealth impact of the level of control over the target secured 
by the acquirer, as measured by the proportion of target shares that the acquirer owns post-acquisition. 
For that we form three groups: the 'full-ownership' group where the acquirer owns 100% of the shares of 
the target; the 'control' group where the acquirer owns more than 50% of the target's shares after the 
transaction (but less than 100%); and the 'toe-hold' group where the acquirer has a minority stake of less 
than 50%, in the target after the transaction. 
 
                                                          
16 It follows sensitivity analysis on the effect of our choice on our results which show that the addition of the hostile takeovers in 
the ‘others’ group (or their complete elimination) does not qualitatively affect the results. 
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3.2 Descriptive statistics. 
In Table 1 we present the annual distribution of the number of deals and the mean and median of 
the market value of acquirers, the deal value and the relative size of acquirer and target.17 The number of 
deals increases between 1984 and the late 1990s. Around the 1992 financial crisis, M&A activity in the 
shipping industry slowed. There was an upward trend towards the end of the 1990s, which reached a peak 
of 66 deals in 1997. There was a decline in 2001/2002, seemingly triggered by the economic fallout from 
the dot.com bubble, followed by an increasing trend until 2007, and prior to the recent crisis, when it had 
reached an all-time high of 92 annual deals. The annual distribution does not reveal any striking and 
consistent pattern except that acquirers are becoming consistently larger with average market 
capitalisation over US$ 1 billion since 2004. 
[Please Insert Table 1 About Here] 
The largest acquirers are from Asia, with an average market capitalisation of $1.8 billion, followed by 
European acquirers that average $1.5 billion and the North American acquirers average $0.9 billion. The 
largest deals however, are North American with an average deal value of $156 million, followed by 
European and ‘Others’ and the smallest deals are Asian with average deal values of $138 million, $113 
million and $68 million respectively. The acquirers in our sample are classified according to their 4-digit 
Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code into ten industry groups: 4412-Deep sea foreign transportation 
of freight (791 deals); 4424-Deep sea domestic transportation of freight (31 deals); 4449-Water 
transportation of freight (96 deals); 4481-Deep sea transportation of passengers, excluding ferries (18 
deals); 4482-Ferries (14 deals); 4489-Water transportation of passengers (12 deals); 4492-Towing and 
tugboat services(20 deals); 4493-Marinas (20 deals); 4499-Water transportation services (75 deals) and 
4491-Marine cargo handling (189 deals). 
For the purpose of meaningful and manageable presentation of findings, we classify our sample into 
three composite sectors18: 
1. FRTR Group (Freight Transportation group): includes 918 deals by acquirers in the sectors 
4412, 4424 and 4449.19 
2. PFMA Group (Passengers, Ferries, Marinas and Services group): includes 159 deals by acquirers 
in the sectors: 4481, 4482, 4489, 4492, 4493 and 4499.20 
3. MC Group (Marine Cargo Handling group): includes acquirers in the 4491 sector (189 deals).21 
                                                          
17  Relative size is defined as the ratio of the market value of the target to the market value of the acquirer. 
18  The results distributed across individual sector are available on request from the authors. 
19  E.g. Deal 1: Mitra Bahtera Segarasejati (Indonesia) acquired Usama Adhi Sejahtera PT (Indonesia) or Deal 2: Nippon 
Yusen KK (Japan) acquired Maestra Navegacao SA (Brazil). 
20  E.g. Deal 1: Shinwa Naiko Kaiun Kasiha (Japan) acquired Muromachi Shipping Co Ltd. (Japan) or Deal 2: ANEK Lines 
SA (Greece) acquired Lesvos Maritime Co. (Greece). 
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Descriptive statistics of accounting and market variables for acquirers and targets are presented in 
Table 2. The market and accounting monetary values are reported in US$ billions. The data are from 
Datastream and data unavailability restricts the sample size per variable. 
[Please Insert Table 2 About Here] 
Acquirers are on average more than twice the size of the targets with average market capitalisations 
of $1.59 billion and $0.63 billion respectively. The average total assets of acquirers are 65% more than 
those of targets. The average net income of acquirers is $113 million, which is eight times the average net 
income of the targets ($14 million) but their sales are only 85% higher ($2.23 billion versus $1.20 billion 
respectively). The acquirers’ operating cash and interest cover are also higher than those of the targets. 
Firms naturally suffer losses in certain years as reflected in negative minimum values. The average 
operating margins of acquirers are almost 50% higher than those of targets: acquirers are clearly more 
profitable. The average return on assets (ROA) of the acquirers (4.1%) is nearly four times that of the 1.1% 
earned by targets. Overall the accounting and market data support the view that acquirers are better 
performing, better capitalised and higher valued companies than targets. 
3.3 Methodology and tests. 
We use a standard market model approach to estimate the daily abnormal returns of the sample of 
firms (Brown and Warner 1985). The standard market model uses an OLS regression to estimate the 
parameters of the market model, which regress the estimation-period daily returns of a firm on the daily 
returns of a suitable market index from the same estimation period. The estimated coefficients are used to 
compute the expected returns in the event period. The abnormal returns are then specified as: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑖
2)          (4) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) = ?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡) 
Rit is firm i's daily stock return on date t, Rmt is the return on a suitable market index m, also on date t, 
while ?̂?𝑖 and β̂𝑖  are estimated from a period prior to the event. Day zero is the deal announcement day 
and reference to 'days' means trading days relative to the announcement on day zero. All announcement 
dates on SDC are checked and where they fall on non-trading days, they have been adjusted to instead fall 
on the nearest following trading day. The parameters of the market model are estimated from day -240 to 
day -60 and the width of the event period is determined from the market response to the announcement.22 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
21  E.g. Deal 1: Baltic Oil Terminals PLC (U.K.) acquired Dan-Balt Tank Lager A/S (Denmark) or Deal 2: Teco Maritime 
ASA (Norway) acquired Marine Trans A/S (Norway). 
22  The event window includes all days around the announcement day zero that have average abnormal returns of the same sign 
and significance as those on day zero. If the abnormal return on day zero is not significant, the event window is (-1,+1). Day -1 is 
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We require a minimum of 120 observations in the estimation period. There is evidence, as noted in Brown 
and Warner (1985), that extracting the parameters of the market model from an estimation period is 
unlikely to improve the abnormal return estimates in the event period, compared to using the market-
adjusted model, which is a special case of the market model, where 𝛼𝑖  and β𝑖  are not estimated but 
restricted to be zero and one respectively, for all firms. This conclusion is valid only for those samples 
where the individual firms are randomly selected from the population of all listed firms and hence on 
average the values of 𝛼𝑖  and β𝑖  will equal zero and one respectively. Since our sample is exclusively from 
the shipping industry, the value of 𝛼𝑖  will not equal zero and β𝑖  will not equal one but the shipping 
sector’s beta. We are, therefore, justified in using the market model approach. Given that we have M&As 
from 67 countries in our sample, we use the main stock market index associated with a nation where such 
an index is available for the full estimation and event period. In cases where such an index is not available, 
we employ the World Marine Transportation Index (WMT) from Datastream.23 
Average Abnormal Return (AR) on a daily basis in the event period is: 
𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1           (5) 
where N is the number of firms in the sample. 
Average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) for a given window of length L in the event period is: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐿 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝐴?̃?𝑖
𝐿𝑁
𝑖=1            (6) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝐴?̃?𝑖
𝐿 = ∑ 𝐴?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝐿
𝑡=1
  
We compute test-statistics for the average daily abnormal return. The Standardised Abnormal Return 
(SAR) for a firm i, on day t, is: 
𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝜎𝑖
~𝑁(0,1)          (7) 
where 𝜎𝑖 is the standard deviation of the abnormal returns of firm i, estimated from day -240 to day 
-61. 
𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 ~𝑁 (0,
1
𝑁
)         (8) 
𝑡𝐴𝑅 = √𝑁( 𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡 ) ~ 𝑁(0,1)         (9) 
We also compute test-statistics for the average CARs. The Cumulative Standardised Abnormal Return 
(CSAR) for a firm i, for a window of length L, is: 
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝐿 = ∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝐿
𝑡=1  ~ 𝑁(0, 𝐿)        (10) 
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝐿 =  
1
𝑁
∑
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝐿
√𝐿
𝑁
𝑖=1  ~ 𝑁 (0,
1
𝑁
)       (11) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
taken to cover the possibility of leakage of information just before the announcement and Day +1 is included to cover the 
possibility that, when the announcement has occurred near the close of trading on day 0, the effect will be reflected on day +1. 
23  Firms are sometimes listed in stock markets located in countries other than the country of their domicile. The country of 
domicile may or may not have a stock exchange. The relevant market index for such firms is that of the stock exchange in which 
they are listed. 
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𝑡𝐶𝐴𝑅 = √𝑁(𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝐿 ) ~ 𝑁(0,1)        (12) 
Since there are cross-sectional differences in the level of response to an M&A announcement, this 
produces an increases in the variance of the abnormal returns. We then further amend the standard errors 
according to the adjustment suggested by Harrington and Shrider (2007).24 We employ OLS to investigate 
the relationship between the abnormal returns and several firm and deal characteristics as well as 
macroeconomic factors as discussed earlier in the theoretical expectations section. We extend our analysis 
to study potential differences in this relationship across three major geographical regions and four 
maritime sectors. 
To examine the influence of several firm and deal characteristics as well as macroeconomic factors 
on the likelihood of acquirers engaging in M&As in periods of changing regulatory oversight in the US and 
the EU, we employ a multinomial logit model as specified in Greene (2007). 
 
The multinomial logit model is specified as: 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗|𝜷𝑗
′ 𝒙𝑖 ) =
𝑒
(𝜷𝑗
′ 𝒙𝑖 )
1+∑ 𝑒𝜷𝑘
′ 𝒙𝑖𝐽
1
; 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1,2, … 𝐽.       (13) 
 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 0|𝜷𝑗
′ 𝒙𝑖 ) =
1
1+∑ 𝑒𝜷𝑘
′ 𝒙𝑖𝐽
1
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜷𝑗=0
′ = 0      (14) 
where 𝑦𝑖  denotes the group to which deal i belongs, 𝜷𝑗
′  is a vector of parameters to be estimated for 
each group j and 𝒙𝑖  denotes the vector of variables thought to explain the likelihood of belonging to 
different groups. 
Although the typical practice in respect to logit models is to report the estimated coefficients, since 
the coefficients in non-linear models are difficult to interpret, we report the marginal probabilities. As 
Castillo-Manzano and Loez-Valpuesta (2010) note, in logit models only the sign of the coefficients is 
meaningful and to extract interpretable magnitudes we need to compute the marginal effects of the logit 
models. The marginal effects of the various factors in our model on the probabilities are computed as: 
 
∂Pj
∂𝐗i
= Pj[𝛃j − ?̅?].           (15) 
 
where ?̅? = ∑ Pk𝛃kk  (i.e. the probability weighted average of the 𝛃k). 
 
To implement the model, we divide time into three periods: first, we classify as the deregulatory 
period, the years before the passage of OSRA, in 2000; second, we classify as the intervening period, the 
years between the passage of OSRA in 2000 and 2008, when the EU repealed the unique exemption that 
had been granted to shipping, and  finally, we classify as the regulated period, the years after 2008 when 
both the OSRA restrictions apply in the US and the EU competition regulations apply in Europe. The 
                                                          
24  We thank one of the anonymous referees for this suggestion. The key effect that we observe following the adjustment is a 
reduction in the standard errors. 
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regulated period, pre-OSRA is coded as the base period (coded 0), while 2000 to 2008 is the intervening 
period (coded 1) and the regulated period is the post-EU-repeal period after 2008 (coded 2). 
4. Results. 
4.1 Event period returns for acquirers and targets. 
The results of the event study are reported in Table 3, which in Panel A lists daily average abnormal 
returns from five days prior to the announcement date of the M&A to five days after. 25 No evidence of a 
pre-announcement drift in the share price of either acquirer or target firms are observed, which implies the 
M&A announcement was a surprise to the market.26 In Panel B, we see that acquiring firms earn positive 
abnormal returns of 1.2% over the event window from three days prior to the announcement to one day 
after. Target firms experience positive abnormal returns of 3.3% over the same event window (-3, +1). The 
results reported in Panel C show that, on average, target firms realized significant economic value gains of 
US$ 6.8 million and though the economic value gains to acquirers of US$ 7.7 million are not significant, 
there was significant combined wealth creation of US$ 14.5 million. Our finding that there is overall 
economic value creation means that on average, shipping M&As can be thought of as wealth-enhancing 
events.   Shipping acquirers make abnormal returns in contrast to the findings reported in the general M&A 
literature. 
[Please Insert Table 3 About Here] 
4.2 Regions and sectors: Differences in cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). 
The distributions of CARs for acquirers and targets across primary shipping sectors are reported in 
Panel A of Table 4 and across major global regions in Panel B.  One important finding in Table 4 is the 
robustness of the finding that equity markets evaluate acquirers and targets positively in the 
announcement period in all regions and in all sectors, except for acquirers in the rest of the world. While 
our results for shipping M&As in North America correspond to the positive abnormal returns reported in 
Andreou et al., (2012) for freight-related M&As in the US, we draw attention to the variation in CARs across 
regions and across different sectors.27 The CARs for acquirers are significantly different across sectors (F-
stat 2.80) but not across regions and, in contrast, the results for targets exhibit the opposite pattern. The 
CARs for targets are marginally different across regions but not sectors (F-stat 1.97). Furthermore, equity 
markets' responses to shipping M&As differ markedly between acquirers and targets. Target shareholders’ 
wealth gains exceed that for acquirers almost always (sometimes by more than a factor of three) in all 
                                                          
25  In Panel A we report daily average abnormal returns to justify the choice of specific event windows for acquirers and targets. 
26  The event study literature typically has interpreted, abnormal returns prior to the announcement of an event, as evidence of 
information leakage in the pre-announcement period. 
27  The results in Andreou et al. (2012) are strictly not comparable to our shipping-specific study since they investigate vertical 
integration in the transport industry in the USA and use M&As to study freight transportation firms. Shipping firms are only a 
part of their study, which includes rail road firms, road haulage firms, shipping firms, and others. 
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shipping regions and in all shipping sectors. 28 We conclude from Table 4, that the overall profile (in Table 3) 
of positive CARs is largely robust across regions and sectors and cannot be attributed to either regional 
variations in the shipping industry (e.g. Europe vs. Asia) or to specific shipping sectors (e.g. ports vs. liners). 
Nevertheless, we confirm that the magnitude of the positive abnormal returns is indeed different across 
regions for targets and across sectors for acquirers. 
[Please Insert Table 4 About Here] 
4.3 Cross-border vs. domestic. 
Following Brooks and Ritchie (2006), who find that nearly 40% of all global shipping M&As are cross-
border deals, we expect a prolonged period of global consolidation in the shipping industry. Since a study 
restricted to domestic M&As would exclude a large proportion of the global M&As, we study cross-border 
and domestic deals and their differences, the results for which are reported in Table 5. Differences in CARs 
are reported in Panel A and economic value in dollar terms in Panel B. The market responds positively when 
there is an announcement that a firm is involved in a deal, whether as an acquirer or target either in cross-
border or domestic M&As (Panel A). The size of the positive target reaction is markedly higher in cross-
border deals than domestic deals. Although CARs of acquirers in domestic deals are statistically significant 
higher than for cross-border deals, this difference is small (0.2%). This finding provides weak support for 
our expectation regarding acquirer and target firms in cross-border deals. We also measure and test for 
economic value effects. The important result is that when a firm is a target in a cross border M&A, on 
average, it makes US$ 16.0 million, which is significantly higher than the average US$ 3.2 million made by 
targets in domestic deals. For acquirers, however, there are no significant differences in dollar effects. Our 
results are consistent with the findings in Erel et al. (2012) who focus only on cross-border M&As but cover 
all deals globally. We conclude that cross-border deals are strategic decisions that create economic value. 
The acquirers do not gain but the targets achieve significant gains, which are attributable to entry 
premiums paid by the foreign acquirer. The combined effect is that cross-border deals create significantly 
higher economic value than domestic deals. 
[Please Insert Table 5 About Here] 
4.4 Focus vs. diversification. 
CARs for focus-increasing and diversifying M&As are shown in Panel A of Table 6 and dollar value are 
reported in Panel B. Focus is value enhancing for the target firms while diversification is marginally better 
for acquirers. For targets, we observe positive market responses to the announcement of both focus-
                                                          
28  The t-test of difference-in-means between acquirers and targets always strongly rejects the null of equality-in-means. The test 
of difference in CARs between acquirers and targets is significant in every region and every sector. The exception is that 
acquirers in the Passenger, Ferries and Marinas sector experience higher CARs than targets. 
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increasing and diversifying takeovers, of 3.4% and 3.1% respectively. In contrast the shareholders of 
acquirers realise higher wealth gains of 1.24% in diversifying compared to 1.21% in focus-increasing deals. 
Furthermore, total economic value creation is significant and positive in both focus-increasing and 
diversifying deals and significantly higher for focus increasing deals. These results for total economic value 
changes are consistent with the evidence reported in the general M&A literature (John and Ofek, 1995). We 
conclude that in shipping M&As, focus-increasing deals create more economic value than diversifying deals 
though the major portion of the wealth created is captured by the target and not the acquirer. 
[Please Insert Table 6 About Here] 
4.5 Private vs. public targets. 
We examine the differences in the CARs between acquirers that had taken over public targets as 
compared to private targets. The results reported in Table 7 shows that the abnormal returns of acquirers 
are positive whether they takeover a public or a private target. However, the positive and statistically 
significant CARs of 2.1% for the shareholders of acquirers of public targets are significantly higher than the 
0.9% positive and statistically significant CARs realised by the shareholders of acquirers of private targets. 
This result is contrary to the prior evidence reported in Fuller et al. (2002) and later in Faccio and Masulis 
(2005). We find that acquirers create economic value, when taking over public firms or private firms and, 
on average, the value created is US$ 3.9 million compared to the US$ 3.1 million when taking over private 
firms.29 One possible explanation for this finding is that in the shipping sector, private targets could have 
significant bargaining power relative to acquirers. This power would enable targets to appropriate relatively 
larger proportions of any economic value creation anticipated for the acquisition leaving less for the 
acquirer. An alternative explanation could be that acquirers are willing to pay more to private targets for 
strategic reasons, such as market share and growth and to deny rivals access to specific routes or ports or 
hinterland chains. 
[Please Insert Table 7 About Here] 
4.6 Effect of method of payment. 
Shareholders of acquirer firms where stock is the means of payment realise higher abnormal returns 
than when cash is used, in line with our expectation as discussed in section 2.2. Our findings, presented in 
Table 8, Panel A, show that in cash acquisitions, acquirer shareholders realise statistically significant 3.8% 
                                                          
29  The results reported suffer a potential upward bias in that acquirers might release 'good' news at the same time, as they 
announce an M&A. It can be difficult to disentangle the abnormal returns that can be 'truly' associated with the M&A news 
from the positive reaction expected from the strategic release of the 'good' news (Bhagat, et al., 2002). However, as Netter et 
al., (2010) point out, such confounding events and strategic releases of good news are more likely to occur in the case of private 
targets than for public targets, since capital market regulations, in most countries, control the timing of announcements of 
M&As for public targets. Note that we have not reported results for private acquiring firms taking over either public or private 
targets. 
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CARs compared to 2.9% when stock is used. Shareholders of the target earn CARs of 5.2% and 2.6% in cash 
and stock deals respectively. Cash-financed deals generate significant economic value, on average, of US$ 
14.6 million, of which US$ 5.2 million is distributed to acquirers and US$ 9.4 million to targets. The highest 
average economic value creation of $26.3 million is associated with equity financed deals and though 
insignificant, it is shared 3:1 between acquirers and targets. One possible explanation for these findings 
could be that the dollar value gains realised by the public acquirers, when they takeover private targets, 
exceed the dollar losses suffered by the acquires taking over public targets and paying with stock, in line 
with the arguments in Fuller et al. (2002). Overall, there is a statistically significant difference in the CARs of 
acquirers for different methods of payment (F-stat of 10.53). These findings are consistent with results 
reported by Fuller et al. (2002) and later by Faccio and Masulis (2005). 
[Please Insert Table 8 About Here] 
4.7 Friendly M&As. 
We observe that in friendly deals, targets benefit more than in non-friendly deals while the reverse 
applies to acquirers. A possible reason for this finding is that, in unfriendly deals, acquirers are seeking to 
implement operational improvements that will not be friendly to the target management, a strategy 
documented as being used to realise larger gains for the acquirer (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). In Table 9 we 
present the results of the analysis of the relationship between the attitude of the deal and the wealth 
effects to the shareholders of the acquirer and target. In general, although both acquirers and targets 
realise positive wealth gains in all three groups, these gains are not significantly different across the groups 
for either acquirer or target. 
[Please Insert Table 9 About Here] 
Acquirers in friendly deals gain a significant 1.1% and those in the neutral group 2.1%. The targets in 
friendly deals earn significant abnormal returns of 3.3%, which is more than 20% higher than the 2.7% 
earned by targets in the neutral group. The F-tests confirm that the abnormal returns of neither the 
acquirers nor the targets differ significantly among the three groups. Since we do not observe negative 
abnormal returns to acquirers, however, we conclude that there is no evidence of overpayment by shipping 
acquirers in friendly deals and this contradicts the hubris notion proposed by Roll (1986). The dollar value 
effects are not significantly different between the three groups for either the acquirers or the targets. Small 
and insignificant losses are experienced by acquirers in friendly deals while dollar gains for targets are a 
significant $6.2 million and $ 7.6 million, on average, for the friendly and neutral groups, respectively. 
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4.8 Level of ownership in the target. 
We denote three level of ownership: ‘full ownership’ when the acquirer own 100% of the target; 
‘control’ where the acquirer owns at least 50% but less than 100%; and ‘toehold’ where the acquirer owns 
less than 50%.  We find a positive relationship between the level of ownership that the acquirer achieves in 
the target and the wealth gains of the target shareholders, whereas for acquirers we find a non-monotonic 
relationship. The wealth effects of the level of ownership are reported in Table 10. The average abnormal 
returns of acquirers are positive and statistically significant across all three levels of ownership but differ 
significantly across the three groups (F-stat: 2.06). The acquirers that achieve ‘control’ benefit the most, 
realising significant CARs of 2.0% compared to the 0.7% earned by acquirers that secure ‘full-ownership’ 
while acquirers that build only a ‘toehold’ earn merely 0.8% CARs.  A possible explanation for this finding is 
that where acquirers seek ‘full ownership’ rather than ‘control’, large block holder and family interests may 
need to be bought out at a premium. 
[Please Insert Table 10 About Here] 
The CARs for target shareholders are positive and significant for all three groups. Targets in the ‘full 
ownership’ group realize CARs of 4.2%, whereas targets in the ‘control’ and ‘toehold’ groups earn 3.9% and 
3.3% respectively but these target gains are not significantly different across the three groups. We observe 
the largest economic value creation of US$ 12.1 million when acquirers obtain full ownership of the target. 
More than 80% of this value creation is captured by the target shareholders, who realise, on average, US$ 
10.36 million compared to the US$ 1.77 million realised by acquirer shareholders. Interestingly, we see that 
in the ‘control’ group there is a transfer of wealth from acquirers to targets. In these deals the acquirers 
loose, on average, US$ 2.97 million while targets enjoy average significant economic value creation of US$ 
8.1 million.  
4.9 Bargaining power. 
Our results indicate an indirect relationship between the bargaining power as measured by relative 
size of the target to the acquirer market value and the changes to the wealth of shareholders of the 
acquirer at the announcement of the takeover deal. In Table 11, we report the CARs for acquirers and 
targets across quartiles of the relative size ratio and market value of the acquirer in US$. We document 
positive and significant CARs for acquirers in the middle quartiles of relative size that diminish to 
insignificant levels in the highest and lowest quartiles although we note that somewhat larger gains are 
made in the smaller quartiles. This relationship between relative size and acquirer’s CARS is dissimilar to 
Fuller et al. (2002). The targets, in contrast, earn positive and significant CARs in all quartiles and these 
target gains are significantly higher than the gains of acquirers in each quartile. A possible reason for this 
finding is that acquirers with higher bargaining power extract better terms and hence secure larger gains 
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for their shareholders.  In deals where the target is very small relative to the acquirer, the effect of the deal 
on the acquirer might be too small to be detected.  In contrast, when acquirers takeover relatively larger 
targets they may face integration stage problems that inhibit the realisation of potential synergistic gains 
and they are unable to create shareholder wealth. 
[Please Insert Table 11 About Here] 
In respect to the size of the acquirer, we find an inverse relationship between the market value of the 
acquirer and the abnormal returns at the announcement of the deal. We find positive and significant CARs 
for acquirers in the lowest quartiles of size in contrast to the insignificant effects in the highest two 
quartiles. The targets, however, realise positive and significant CARs in all quartiles which are generally 
significantly higher than acquirer CARs. We suggest that a possible reason for this finding is that larger 
acquirers may bid away to the target the potential gains from an acquisition. In the last row we report the 
F-value of the test that the CARs are similar across all quartiles which is significant for acquirers but not for 
targets. 
4.10 Determinants of CARs. 
In this section we employ multivariate tests on the determinants of the acquirer’s cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) in the announcement period and present the results in Table 12. The coefficients 
of the multivariate models are estimated using an OLS approach and several hypothesised determinants of 
the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of acquirers are investigated, as discussed in section 2.2. 
Furthermore, we report the results of estimating our models for the overall global sample, those in four 
different maritime sectors and finally for those in three different geographical regions. 
[Please Insert Table 12 About Here] 
The main patterns observed from the results reported in Table 12 are that there are four primary 
factors that are consistent across regions and sectors: size (-), cross-border deals (+), stock financing (+) and 
profitability (+). The explanatory power (R2) of the models varies from 7% to 54%.30 For the overall sample, 
we find that the CARs to shipping acquirers are higher when the acquirer nation’s currency strengthens 
relative to the target nation’s currency, the higher the price-earnings ratio of the acquirer, financed by 
either stock or cash and for cross-border deals. In contrast, the CARs to acquirers are lower for larger 
acquirers and when targeting private firms. More specifically, CARs for M&As by deep sea liner firms are 
higher when deals are cross-border, stock finance is used and when the acquirer’s stock market is growing 
                                                          
30  It is a well-known and established fact that the regressions seeking to explain the abnormal returns observed at the 
announcement of an event typically attain low explanatory power. For example, Fuller et al. 2002 Table VII report R2 that 
ranges from 4.6% to 7.4% for OLS regressions of acquirer CARs on several explanatory variables. We further note that 
correlation between the explanatory variables is not likely to be a major issue as the highest correlation we found was 0.36. 
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faster than the target’s. Nevertheless, since the explanatory power for the deep sea liner sector is low we 
conjecture that there are complex factors in this group that drive the returns and that deep sea liner firms 
may be a heterogeneous group.31 We also find that the CARs for M&As by domestic maritime freight firms 
are positively associated with the acquirers’ profitability and negatively with its size which indicates that 
the more successful M&As are implemented by the small and profitable firms in this sector. 
For firms in the passenger cruisers and ferries sector, the CARs are higher in cross-border deals, for 
more profitable acquirers, stock financed deals and lower for larger firms with our model exhibiting high 
explanatory power. For M&As by port and forwarding firms, CARs are negatively associated with friendly 
deals and acquirer size but positively to the acquirer having a stronger currency than the target. 
Furthermore, there are regional variations: European acquirers realize higher CARs when they engage in 
cross-border deals, use stock finance, have higher earnings multiples and are smaller firms; North American 
shipping firms benefit the most when they are more profitable and implement deals when their macro-
economic growth rate is lower and the stock market index growth is higher than the target’s; Asian 
acquirers earn higher CARs when they are smaller, conclude cross-border deals when their macro-economic 
growth rate is higher than the target’s and use stock finance. Overall, we note that the determinants of the 
abnormal returns associated with M&A in the shipping industry vary both across major regions and across 
sectors. 
4.11 Explaining the likelihood of mergers in different regulatory periods. 
To investigate the determinants of the likelihood of shipping firms engaging in M&A activities during 
periods of differing regulatory arrangements, we estimate a multinomial logit model. We estimate this 
model for the global sample and for Europe and Asia. We omit N. America as the sample size is not large 
enough to reliably report results for a multinomial logit model and although we can estimate the model in 
truncated form, we leave the study of this group for future research. Before discussing the results we 
underline a feature which assists in the interpretation of the results reported in Table 13. Unlike the typical 
reporting of coefficients of a logit model, which are not directly interpretable beyond the sign on the 
coefficient, we report the marginal probabilities associated with the multinomial logit model. The values 
reported in a given row in the table should be interpreted as the change in the probability we would 
observe if that variable were to increase by 1%.32 The results confirm that the likelihood of M&As being 
undertaken varies across the different regulatory periods and within a given period the results also vary 
across regions. 
                                                          
31  The deep sea liner group can be categorised into container fleets, dry-bulk and tankers. The operational 
characteristics of these three types of ships are very different. 
32  Technically, we are reporting the first derivative of the logistic probability distribution function. The reported values are the 
infinitesimal change in the probability. Since the logisitic function is nonlinear the first derivative takes different values 
depending on where in the domain the derivative is evaluated. We have evaluated the first derivative when each variable is set 
at the median value of that variable. 
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[Please Insert Table 13 About Here] 
For the overall sample, in the deregulation period (pre-OSRA), a 1% increase in the Baltic Dry Index 
leads to a 0.59% lower likelihood of undertaking an M&A in that period.  Similarly, a 1% increase in the 
bunker fuel price index leads to a 1.02% lower chance of an M&A being completed in the deregulation 
period.  Irrespective of region, an increase in either variable leads to a lower likelihood of an M&A in the 
regulation period. For example, in Asia a 1% increase in the Baltic Dry Index leads to a 0.54% lower chance 
of an M&A in the regulation period, but to a 0.80% reduction for Europe. The likelihood of M&As occurring, 
since 2008, rises by 3.93% in response to a Bunker Fuel Index rise of 1%, especially in Europe but not in 
Asia.  A rise in bunker costs leads to a quadrupling of the likelihood of an M&A occurring post-2008 in 
European shipping but that is not the case among Asian shipping firms, who appear insulated from M&A 
pressures associated with rising bunker costs. Our conclusion from these results is that, in Europe, shipping 
firms are facing increasing pressure to save costs or otherwise achieve economies of scale. 
Similarly we find that firm size has differential marginal effects across different regulatory periods. 
Larger European shipping firms are 0.94% less likely to engage in M&As prior to the introduction of OSRA in 
2000, while Asian firms are 0.72% more likely.  Post-2008, European firms are 6.22% more likely and Asian 
firms 2.19% more likely to engage in M&As. This finding indicates that European shipping firms have nearly 
3 times the odds of engaging in M&As compared to Asian shipping firms. Another interesting result with 
respect to financing is that European shipping firms are over 6% more likely to use cash financing in M&As 
prior to the EU repeal and are 10.98% less likely to be financed by cash after that, while Asian shipping 
firms are now 0.95% more likely to employ cash financing. Overall, there is a variation in the determinants 
of the merger propensities of shipping firms, across different regulatory periods and different regions. 
5. Conclusion. 
We report results from the first global and comprehensive study of the wealth effects of shipping 
M&As for acquirers and targets. Using the event-study methodology to measure the equity markets 
evaluation of these events, we find that targets realise CARs of 3.3% and acquires 1.2% at announcement. 
Shipping M&As create significant wealth for the companies involved which is captured mostly by the 
target’s shareholders.  Interestingly, acquirers realise positive CARs contrary to evidence reported in 
general M&A studies.   The magnitude of the positive abnormal returns is different across sectors for 
acquirers and across regions for targets.  The largest wealth creation for acquirers is observed in the 
following sectors: passengers, ferries, marinas and services. 
We reach some interesting conclusions specific to the shipping industry contrary to the evidence 
reported for M&As in general.  Shipping M&As that are diversifying lead to larger gains for shareholders of 
both acquirers and targets than focus-increasing transactions. The acquirers of public targets gain more 
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than acquirers of private targets. Our interpretation is that there are clear economies of scope in the 
shipping industry and that private firms wield significant bargaining power. Additionally, deals involving 
cash as the means of payment lead to higher gains than when stock is used, a result that holds more for 
targets than for acquirers. Furthermore, our results show that targets gain more in friendly deals while 
acquirers gain more in deals that are not friendly. Finally, since relative size is associated with acquirer 
wealth gains, we conclude that acquirers with higher bargaining power extract better terms and hence 
secure larger gains for their shareholders. Target shareholders gain, in the announcement period 
(irrespective of variations in relative size and acquirer size), while acquirers that gain are smaller or involved 
in small deals. 
Overall, the study sheds light on important aspects of M&As in the shipping industry and documents 
factors that drive the associated wealth effects. The determinant of the acquirer’s shareholder wealth gains 
are smaller acquirer size, higher acquirer profitability, use of stock financing and engaging in cross-border 
deals. We conclude that the more efficient firms in the maritime industry have a higher likelihood of 
embarking on consolidation via M&As within their industry. The determinants of such gains are different 
across regions and sectors. By investigating the different drivers of the propensity to merge in different 
regulatory periods, we also conclude that European shipping firms are sensitive to changes in bunker rates 
but interestingly that Asian firms are not, while the larger firms in Europe and Asia are both more likely to 
engage in M&As after the EU repeal of exemption from competition regulations than in previous periods. 
Furthermore, while in the pre-OSRA period European and Asian shipping firms are more likely to engage in 
concentration-increasing M&As, they are now less likely to do so. Finally, we conclude that while European 
shipping firms were 1.5 times more likely to use cash financing for M&As prior to the passage of OSRA than 
after the EU repeal of exemption, Asian shipping firms are three times more likely to use cash financing 
after the EU repeal. 
The study makes five contributions to the shipping transportation literature.  It reports the first 
globally comprehensive set of results of the wealth implications for targets and acquirers in shipping M&As.  
The finding that both acquirers and targets benefit in shipping M&As is different from that reported in the 
general M&A literature where targets gain but acquirers not.  Secondly, this is the first study that examines 
wealth effects and the economic effects of M&As on both targets and acquirers across regions and sectors. 
We further investigate the differential wealth effects of the strategies pursued by shipping firms and 
conclude that there are clear economies of scope in the shipping industry and that private firms wield 
significant bargaining power. Additionally, the study avoids sample selection biases by including all shipping 
M&As making the findings representative and generalisable of M&As in the entire shipping industry. 
Furthermore, exploring the determinants of wealth effects we document variations in these determinants 
across maritime sectors and geographical regions. The final contribution is that regulatory interventions in 
the US and the EU, have had significant and important effects on the shipping industry.  We report that the 
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determinants of the propensities to merge differ across three periods of major regulatory change in the 
shipping industry. 
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
CAR(-3, +1) Cumulative abnormal return of bidder’s stock over the event window around 
the announcement day 0. Our announcement event window is (-3, +1) for 
bidders and (-3, +1) for targets. We calculate abnormal returns using the 
market model, with parameters estimated over the 120 days prior to our 
observation period from day -180 to day -61 before the announcement day 0. 
As market returns, we use the returns of the stock market index where our 
sample companies are listed. 
Region  Four broad geographical regions of the country of acquirer or target: Europe, 
North America, Asia and the rest of the world. 
SIC Sector  The 4-digit SIC code for acquirers and target is used to group them in three 
larger groups. 
Cross-border  Dummy variable: one when acquirer and target are from different countries, 
zero otherwise (i.e. domestic).  
Focus Dummy variable: one when the acquirer and target share the same 4-digit SIC 
code and the deal increases acquirer focus; zero otherwise, when the deal is 
classified as diversifying transaction. 
Private Target Dummy variable: one when the target is privately held company, zero 
otherwise. 
Cash finance  Method of payment: one when the payment is made with cash, two when the 
acquirer pays with stock and three otherwise. 
Deal Attitude Friendly if the deal is recommended by the management of the target, neutral 
if SDC define the deal as neutral, hostile and the rest are classified as 'others'. 
Deal value The value of the deal as reported in SDC in US$ billion. 
Market-to-Book (MTB) 
 
The market value of equity one month prior to the acquisition announcement 
divided by the book value of equity as reported in the financial statements at 
the financial year-end prior to the announcement. Both values are from 
Datastream (is a valuation multiple that can act as a measure of growth 
prospects) 
Price-Earnings (PE) ratio  Share price (one month before announcement) divided by earnings-per-share 
(also a valuation multiple and one that acts as measure of the reciprocal of 
cost of equity) - from Datastream. 
Return on Assets (ROA) Profit before Interest and Tax divided by Total Assets (a measure of 
investment performance) - from Datastream. 
Interest Cover Profit before Interest and Tax divided by Interest Expense (measure of 
corporate liquidity) - from Datastream. 
Operating Margin Operating Profit divided by Sales (measure of operating profitability) - from 
Datastream. 
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Figure 1 
Global shipping M&A activity a 
 
a All shipping mergers since 1984 reported on Securities Data Corporation's merger and acquisition database. A total 
of 4,122 deals with a total value of US$ 200.2 billion. The left-hand side axis shows the total annual deal value in US$ 
millions and the right-hand side axis the number of deals per year. 
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Table 1 
Annual distribution and average annual deal value of freight transportation mergers and acquisitions. a 
 
Panel A: Annual distribution.b               
      Acquirers Size   Deal Value   RelSize Acq/Tar 
Year N   Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median 
1984 4 
 
0.144 0.144 
 
0.022 0.022 
 
1.310 1.310 
1985 2 
 
0.497 0.497 
 
0.272 0.272 
 
1.030 1.030 
1986 5 
 
0.971 0.949 
 
0.509 0.491 
 
1.362 1.360 
1987 8 
 
0.626 0.022 
 
0.128 0.052 
 
1.010 1.010 
1988 12 
 
1.176 0.434 
 
0.052 0.009 
 
1.444 1.820 
1989 19 
 
1.550 0.434 
 
0.136 0.016 
 
1.819 1.650 
1990 24 
 
4.739 6.744 
 
0.044 0.006 
 
4.046 5.418 
1991 29 
 
0.906 0.183 
 
0.097 0.012 
 
2.202 1.830 
1992 28 
 
0.765 0.094 
 
0.109 0.010 
 
2.639 2.510 
1993 39 
 
1.046 0.259 
 
0.010 0.010 
 
2.393 1.890 
1994 45 
 
0.471 0.215 
 
0.015 0.009 
 
1.662 1.530 
1995 59 
 
0.703 0.209 
 
0.076 0.016 
 
1.957 1.880 
1996 52 
 
0.591 0.277 
 
0.050 0.008 
 
1.470 1.430 
1997 66 
 
0.385 0.117 
 
0.088 0.022 
 
1.485 1.315 
1998 54 
 
1.035 0.358 
 
0.190 0.024 
 
2.347 1.810 
1999 53 
 
0.979 0.477 
 
0.066 0.034 
 
1.613 1.510 
2000 55 
 
1.541 0.360 
 
0.068 0.020 
 
1.519 1.310 
2001 45 
 
0.867 0.282 
 
0.172 0.013 
 
1.522 1.125 
2002 47 
 
0.982 0.067 
 
0.018 0.005 
 
1.170 1.200 
2003 53 
 
0.595 0.078 
 
0.453 0.004 
 
0.997 0.810 
2004 60 
 
1.012 0.228 
 
0.092 0.006 
 
1.546 1.400 
2005 71 
 
1.544 0.285 
 
0.174 0.016 
 
1.794 1.690 
2006 81 
 
1.673 0.335 
 
0.130 0.013 
 
1.692 1.565 
2007 92 
 
1.507 0.402 
 
0.087 0.022 
 
1.872 1.740 
2008 61 
 
3.347 1.032 
 
0.164 0.014 
 
2.240 1.985 
2009 63 
 
3.450 0.334 
 
0.043 0.006 
 
1.650 1.630 
2010 62 
 
1.720 0.258 
 
0.060 0.016 
 
1.279 0.880 
2011 77   2.900 0.610   0.075 0.019   1.766 1.040 
Total 1266   1.590 0.295   0.105 0.014   1.755 1.430 
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Panel B: Regional distribution.c               
      Acquirer Size   Deal Value   RelSize Acq/Tar 
Region N   Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median 
Europe 550 
 
1.510 0.301 
 
0.138 0.019 
 
3.950 0.790 
N. America 106 
 
0.877 0.272 
 
0.156 0.030 
 
0.410 0.175 
Asia 524 
 
1.835 0.299 
 
0.068 0.008 
 
0.646 0.300 
Others 86   0.204 0.097   0.113 0.013   0.967 0.268 
Panel C: Sector distribution.d 
             Acquirer Size   Deal Value   RelSize Acq/Tar 
Sectors N   Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median 
FRTR 918 
 
1.803 0.304 
 
0.655 0.151 
 
1.702 0.536 
PFMS 159 
 
0.594 0.143 
 
0.385 0.061 
 
0.760 0.620 
MC 189   1.175 0.300   0.683 0.238   5.651 0.242 
 
a This table provides descriptive statistics for our sample of mergers and acquisitions. Summary statistics are reported 
for the sample, which includes all mergers and acquisitions in the shipping industry covered by the Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) mergers and acquisitions database, from all countries, announced over the period from 1984 to 
2011. 
b Panel A reports the annual distribution of the number of M&A announcements, the mean and median market value 
of equity of acquirers and deal value in US$bn converted at the US$/local currency exchange rate prevailing at the 
announcement date of each deal and the ratio of equity market value of target to acquirer. 
c Panel B reports the distribution of the sample across major regions. 
d Panel C reports the distribution across major shipping sectors: Sector 1 is Freight Transportation (FRTR), sector 2 is 
Passengers, Ferries, Marinas and Services (PFMS) and sector 3 is Marine Cargo Handling (MCH). 
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Table 2 
Acquirers and targets characteristics. a 
 
Variable Acquirers   Targets 
  N Mean Median Minimum Maximum   N Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Market Value ($bn) 856 1.590 0.295 0.000 25.112 
 
195 0.631 0.151 0.001 18.087 
Total Assets ($bn) 876 2.457 0.577 0.002 56.209 
 
165 1.482 0.443 0.001 26.292 
Net Income ($bn) 872 0.113 0.023 -0.731 3.864 
 
168 0.014 0.009 -1.442 0.589 
EBITDA ($bn) 871 0.298 0.065 -0.450 12.516 
 
157 0.104 0.038 -1.123 1.297 
Interest Expense ($bn) 860 0.043 0.009 0.000 1.063 
 
156 0.028 0.009 0.000 0.337 
Operating Income ($bn) 876 0.167 0.030 -0.554 6.606 
 
165 0.049 0.015 -0.625 0.847 
Sales ($bn) 878 2.233 0.267 0.000 48.471 
 
165 1.203 0.246 0.002 20.373 
Operating Cash ($bn) 876 0.212 0.046 -0.195 6.474 
 
165 0.078 0.026 -0.629 1.058 
Interest Cover 848 24.1 6.1 -112.4 4,550.3 
 
148 22.3 4.9 -111.4 158.4 
Operating Margin 865 -0.069 0.092 -70.143 0.767 
 
159 0.098 0.067 -0.033 0.227 
PE 858 15.651 6.115 -112.383 314.741 
 
150 11.235 4.008 -46.382 120.340 
MTB 787 1.925 1.442 -14.005 34.740 
 
147 2.148 1.202 -5.637 9.994 
Return on Assets 860 0.041 0.047 -0.816 0.311   162 0.011 0.028 -0.072 0.096 
 
a The table reports the number, mean, median, minimum and maximum for a number of key accounting and market characteristics of acquirers and targets. Accounting 
data and equity market valuation ratios for the companies in our sample are collected from Datastream. All data relating to monetary values are converted to US$m at the 
US$/local currency exchange rates prevailing at the announcement date of each merger. We report summary statistics for market value of equity, total assets, net income, 
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), interest expense, operating income, sales and operating cash, all in (US$bn) and the following ratios: 
interest cover as a measure of firm-liquidity, operating margin as a measure of operating efficiency, price-earning (PE) and market-to-book (MTB) as measures of equity 
market valuation multiples and finally return on assets as a measure of investment performance. 
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Table 3 
Average abnormal returns for acquirers and targets. 
 
Panel A: Daily Abnormal Returns (AR) around Day 0. a 
  Acquirers Targets 
Day AR % positive AR % positive 
-5 0.001 47.640 0.003* 45.950 
 
(0.028) (34.214) (0.001) (41.667) 
-4 0.001 47.400 0.001 47.030 
 
(0.001) (31.015) (0.001) (58.155) 
-3 0.002* 51.210 0.004*** 57.840** 
 
(0.001) (71.803) (0.001) (27.128) 
-2 0.003** 49.370 0.006*** 56.220* 
 
(0.001) (132.147) (0.001) (33.247) 
-1 0.002*** 48.900 0.004*** 55.140 
 
(0.001) (75.779) (0.001) (39.473) 
0 0.004*** 49.710 0.017*** 55.140 
 
(0.001) (292.756) (0.001) (39.473) 
1 0.001*** 48.900 0.001 45.950 
 
(0.001) (75.779) (0.005) (41.667) 
2 0.001 47.980 0.001 47.570 
 
(0.001) (40.363) (0.003) (71.891) 
3 -0.003** 45.670** -0.005*** 43.240* 
 
(0.001) (17.930) (0.001) (23.526) 
4 -0.002*** 44.410*** 0.000** 50.270 
 
(0.001) (13.481) (0.000) (683.946) 
5 0.001 47.520 0.001 47.570 
  (0.001) (32.539) (0.003) (71.891) 
 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) in various windows. b 
  Acquirers     Targets 
  CAR % positive 
 
  CAR % positive 
-3, +1 0.012*** 52.480 
 
- 3,+1 0.033*** 65.410*** 
  (0.002) (35.935)     (0.003) (15.608) 
 
Panel C: Economic $ Value. c 
Acquirer $ Value Target $ Value Total $ Value 
7.752 6.792** 14.54 
(9.014) (2.602) (7.239) 
 
a Panel A reports in columns two and four, daily average abnormal returns for the full sample of acquirers and 
targets respectively. Columns three and five report the percentage of acquirers and targets with positive 
abnormal returns respectively on each day. 
b Panel B reports Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for various windows. 
c Panel C reports economic value changes. The standard errors are reported in brackets () and in those cases 
where the Levene test of difference in variances is rejected, the Satterthwaite t-test for difference in means is 
used while the normal t-test of difference in means is used otherwise The significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% 
are denoted as *,**,*** respectively. 
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Table 4 
Regions and sectors: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs). 
 
Panel A: CARs (-3+1)for acquirers and targets across sectors. a 
  Acquirer Target t-diff 
FRTR 0.009*** 0.034*** 44.79*** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) 
 
PFMS 0.029*** 0.027*** 17.31*** 
 
(0.01) (0.00) 
 
CM 0.013*** 0.021*** 13.43*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
F Value 2.80** 0.44   
 
   
Panel B: CARs (-3+1)for acquirers and targets across regions. b 
  Acquirer Target t-diff 
Europe 0.009*** 0.033*** 57.59*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
N. America 0.013** 0.045*** 24.49*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
 
Asia 0.017*** 0.023*** 25.93*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
Rest -0.006 0.077*** 19.62*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
 
F Value 0.95 1.97*   
 
a, b The table report CARs for acquirers and targets, in Panel A, split by maritime sectors and in Panel B split by 
major geographic regions. In column four we report the t-test of difference in means between the CARs of 
acquirers and targets in a given region or sector for the announcement window, which for acquirers is from 
day -3 to day +1 and for targets is from day -3 to day +1. The significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted 
as *,**,*** respectively. 
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Table 5 
Cumulative abnormal returns and economic value effects in cross-border and domestic shipping merger deals. 
 
Panel A: CARs. a         
 
Acquirer Target 
 
(-3, +1) % Positive (-3, +1) % Positive 
Domestic 0.01*** 51.41 0.02*** 60.71** 
 
(0.00) (79.13) (0.00) (23.94) 
Cross-Border 0.01*** 54.19 0.06*** 80.00*** 
 
(0.00) (35.37) (0.01) (19.88) 
T-diff 4.84***   31.42***   
 
Panel B: Economic $ Value. b     
 
Acquirer Target Total 
Domestic -2.62 3.19 0.57* 
 
(3.01) (2.04) (1.79) 
Cross-Border 3.39 16.01*** 19.40*** 
 
(5.78) (5.09) (3.20) 
T-diff 0.92 2.34** 3.66*** 
 
a,b Panel A reports the CARs for acquirers and targets respectively, in columns two and four and the percentage 
of positive CARs in columns three and five, for domestic and cross-border deals. Panel B report the dollar value 
effects. The significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted as *,**,*** respectively. 
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Table 6 
Cumulative abnormal returns and economic value effects in focus and diversifying shipping deals. 
 
Panel A: CARs. a         
 
Acquirer   Target   
 
(-3,+1) % Positive (-3,+1) % Positive 
Diversification 0.012*** 52.750 0.031*** 67.530*** 
 
(0.00) (45.01) (0.00) (21.95) 
Focus 0.012*** 52.180 0.034*** 63.890*** 
 
(0.00) (58.84) (0.00) (22.13) 
T-diff 13.926***   2.558**   
 
Panel B: Economic $ Value. b     
 
Acquirer Target Total 
Diversification -3.171 5.898* 2.727* 
 
(3.88) (3.53) (1.86) 
Focus 2.828 6.439*** 9.266*** 
 
(4.32) (2.36) (2.80) 
T-diff 1.040 0.130 3.362*** 
 
a, b Panel A reports for focus increasing and diversifying deals the CARs for acquirers and targets, in columns 
two and four respectively and the percentage of positive CARs in columns three and five while the dollar value 
effects are in Panel B. The significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted as *,**,*** respectively. 
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Table 7 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and economic value effects that involve either private or public targets. a 
 
  (-3,+1) % Positive Economic $ Value 
Public 0.021*** 56.110* 0.039*** 
 
(0.01) (30.89) (0.01) 
Private 0.009*** 51.240 0.031*** 
 
(0.00) (81.40) (0.00) 
T-diff 12.567***   3.500*** 
 
a This table reports CARs for acquirers of public and of private targets. in columns two and four and the 
percentage of positive CARs in columns three. The significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted as 
*,**,*** respectively. 
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Table 8 
This table reports CARs and economic value effects in shipping mergers by method of payment. 
 
Panel A: CARs. a         
 
Acquirer   Target   
 
(-3, +1) % Positive (-3, +1) % Positive 
Cash 0.038*** 67.710*** 0.052*** 77.780** 
 
(0.01) (19.51) (0.01) (33.00) 
Equity 0.029*** 64.440* 0.026* 58.330 
 
(0.01) (33.25) (0.01) (71.44) 
Other 0.008*** 49.720 0.031*** 65.030*** 
 
(0.00) (334.81) (0.00) (18.08) 
F-Value 10.53***   0.58   
 
Panel B: Economic $ Value. b     
 
Acquirer Target Total 
Cash 5.226* 9.385 14.611* 
 
(3.05) (7.89) (8.46) 
Equity 19.398 6.947* 26.345** 
 
(11.77) (4.02) (12.44) 
Other -2.251 5.705** 3.454 
 
(3.34) (2.31) (4.06) 
F-Value 1.62 0.15 1.62 
 
a,b Panel A reports CARs for acquirers and targets in columns two and four respectively and the percentage of 
positive CARs in columns three and five. Panel B report the dollar value effects. The significance levels at 10%, 
5% and 1% are denoted as *,**,*** respectively. 
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Table 9 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) and economic value effects by deal attitude. 
 
Panel A: CARs. a         
 
Acquirer   Target   
 
(-3, +1) % Positive (-3, +1) % Positive 
Friendly 0.011*** 52.170 0.033*** 65.150*** 
 
(0.00) (45.00) (0.00) (18.71) 
Neutral 0.021*** 52.990 0.027*** 68.290** 
 
(0.00) (76.67) (0.00) (29.15) 
Other 0.003 61.110 0.042*** 58.330 
 
(0.00) (64.82) (0.01) (101.02) 
F-Value 1.40   0.17   
 
Panel B: Economic $ Value. b     
 
Acquirer Target Total 
Friendly -0.329 6.184*** 5.86 
 
(3.24) (2.26) (3.95) 
Neutral 1.751 7.637* 9.39 
 
(6.21) (4.37) (7.59) 
Other -14.109 1.952 -12.16 
 
(27.84) (11.07) (29.96) 
F-Value 0.29 0.21 0.41 
 
a Cumulative Abnormal Returns by deal attitude are reported in Panel A. Results are reported in columns two 
and four for acquirers and targets respectively. The percentage of positive CARs are in columns three and five. 
b The dollar value effects for acquirers and targets are in Panel B. The significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% are 
denoted as *,**,*** respectively. 
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Table 10 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) and economic value effects by ownership levels in the target firm. 
 
Panel A: CARs. a         
 
Acquirer   Target   
 
(-3, +1) % Positive (-3, +1) % Positive 
Full Ownership 0.007*** 52.780 0.042*** 70.210*** 
 
(0.003) (55.982) (0.005) (25.334) 
Control 0.020*** 56.030 0.039*** 75.860*** 
 
(0.007) (43.103) (0.007) (27.235) 
Toe Hold 0.008** 49.090 0.033*** 60.340 
 
(0.003) (210.236) (0.004) (38.294) 
F-Value 2.06   0.15   
 
Panel B: Economic $ Value. b     
 
Acquirer Target Total 
Full Ownership 1.771 10.362*** 12.134** 
 
(4.123) (3.243) (5.25) 
Control -2.977 8.080* 5.103 
 
(8.577) (4.490) (9.68) 
Toe Hold 4.027 3.830 7.857 
 
(6.061) (3.717) (7.11) 
F-Value 0.28 0.88 2.74** 
 
a In Panel A, CARs for acquirers and targets are reported in columns 2 and 4 respectively and the percentage of 
positive CARs in columns 3 and 5. 
b Panel B reports the dollar value effects for acquirers and targets. The significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% 
are denoted as *,**,*** respectively. 
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Table 11 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of acquirer and target by quartiles of relative firm size and market value 
of acquirer. a  
  
Quartiles of Relative Size. 
  
Quartiles of Acquirer Market Value in 
US$. 
  Acquirer Target T-diff  
Acquirer Target T-diff 
Q1 0.005 0.064*** 66.166*** 
 
0.027*** 0.071*** 38.368*** 
 
(0.003) (0.007) 
  
(0.006) (0.009) 
 Q2 0.032*** 0.097*** 29.975*** 
 
0.013*** 0.052*** 19.924*** 
 
(0.008) (0.013) 
  
(0.005) (0.009) 
 Q3 0.003** 0.073*** 29.881*** 
 
0.006 0.067*** 28.523*** 
 
(0.001) (0.009) 
  
(0.004) (0.011) 
 Q4 0.010 0.020** 6.842*** 
 
0.000 0.057*** 44.462*** 
 
(0.007) (0.010) 
  
(0.002) (0.008) 
 F Value 4.24*** 1.67     3.47** 0.14   
 
a Relative size is defined as the ratio of the market value of the target to the acquirer. Size of the acquirer is 
defined as its equity market value in US$ one month before the announcement of the deal. The significance 
levels at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted as *,**,*** respectively. 
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Table 12 
Determinants of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs). a 
 
  Overall   Deep Sea 
Domestic 
Freight 
Passenger 
Cruisers 
Ports & 
Forwarders   Europe N. America Asia 
Friendly -0.017 
 
-0.001 -0.025 0.006 -0.087* 
 
-0.046* -0.015 0.006 
 
(0.85) 
 
(0.11) (1.32) (0.23) (1.90) 
 
(1.75) (0.78) (0.52) 
Control of Target 0.007 
 
0.013 -0.030 0.018 -0.037 
 
-0.012 -0.015 0.024* 
 
(0.55) 
 
(1.40) (1.33) (0.71) (0.90) 
 
(0.91) (0.99) (1.93) 
Cross-Border 0.026*** 
 
0.010* -0.033 0.066** 0.048 
 
0.026** -0.005 0.023* 
 
(7.08) 
 
(1.68) (0.81) (2.03) (1.20) 
 
(1.99) (0.43) (1.82) 
Focus-Increasing 0.006 
 
0.004 0.010 0.019 -0.004 
 
-0.010 -0.010 0.019 
 
(0.64) 
 
(0.45) (0.47) (0.41) (0.12) 
 
(0.80) (0.64) (1.26) 
Target is Private -0.013*** 
 
-0.014 0.003 -0.053 -0.002 
 
-0.024 -0.033* -0.014 
 
(3.66) 
 
(1.54) (0.13) (0.79) (0.06) 
 
(1.64) (1.84) (1.20) 
Cash Finance 0.021* 
 
0.018 0.029 -0.024 0.082 
 
-0.003 0.030 0.022 
 
(1.71) 
 
(0.89) (1.06) (0.79) (1.21) 
 
(0.22) (1.50) (0.93) 
Stock Finance 0.039** 
 
0.023** -0.014 0.115** 0.024 
 
0.049** -0.002 0.058** 
 
(2.52) 
 
(1.96) (0.59) (2.33) (1.49) 
 
(1.97) (0.11) (2.61) 
Ln(Size) -0.008*** 
 
-0.002 -0.020** -0.025*** -0.020* 
 
-0.011* -0.004 -0.010*** 
 
(6.86) 
 
(0.83) (2.58) (2.87) (1.71) 
 
(1.88) (0.69) (3.83) 
FX Relative 0.195*** 
 
-0.062 -0.050 0.210 0.932*** 
 
0.165 -0.097 0.168 
 
(4.86) 
 
(1.30) (0.08) (1.43) (3.02) 
 
(1.25) (1.17) (1.04) 
GDP_PPP Relative -0.083 
 
0.149 0.777 0.836 -0.708 
 
-1.845 -0.693* 0.418** 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.89) (0.78) (0.73) (0.83) 
 
(1.62) (1.67) (2.03) 
Mkt Relative -0.018 
 
0.074** -0.025 -0.180 -0.278 
 
0.045 0.137*** -0.004 
 
(1.35) 
 
(2.54) (0.16) (1.16) (1.63) 
 
(0.86) (3.52) (0.08) 
Acquirer PE 0.000*** 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 
0.000** 0.000 0.000 
 
(3.57) 
 
(1.58) (0.97) (0.21) (1.43) 
 
(2.36) (0.17) (1.56) 
Acquirer ROA 0.000 
 
0.000 0.001*** 0.000* 0.000 
 
0.000 0.001*** 0.000* 
 
(0.64) 
 
(0.62) (3.14) (1.87) (0.74) 
 
(0.30) (2.67) (1.66) 
Intercept 0.029 
 
-0.132 -0.455 -0.543 0.398 
 
1.849 0.733* -0.465** 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.81) (0.78) (0.45) (0.40) 
 
(1.61) (1.66) (2.30) 
N 476   317 38 52 69   194 40 225 
R2 0.10   0.07 0.47 0.54 0.48   0.23 0.37 0.19 
 a Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions of CARs for acquirers in shipping M&As. The significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted as *,**,*** respectively.  
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Table 13 
Multinomial Logit Models: Marginal Probabilities. a 
  Overall   Europe   Asia 
 
Deregulated Post-OSRA Post-EU 
 
Deregulated Post-OSRA Post-EU 
 
Deregulated Post-OSRA Post-EU 
Friendly 0.12 0.02 -0.11 
 
-0.22 -0.44 0.57 
 
0.35 0.04 -0.15 
 
(0.28) (0.13) (0.28) 
 
(0.61) (0.48) (0.72) 
 
(0.58) (0.15) (0.31) 
Target Control 0.71*** -0.23** 0.08 
 
1.21*** -0.46 -0.47 
 
1.43*** -0.11 -0.06 
 
(0.24) (0.10) (0.23) 
 
(0.47) (0.42) (0.57) 
 
(0.50) (0.13) (0.26) 
Cross-Border 0.00 0.22* -0.49** 
 
0.35 1.14** -1.33** 
 
-0.07 0.18 -0.37 
 
(0.24) (0.11) (0.21) 
 
(0.53) (0.49) (0.60) 
 
(0.57) (0.16) (0.29) 
Focus 0.55*** -0.12 -0.09 
 
0.73* 0.70* -1.20*** 
 
1.01** -0.15 0.11 
 
(0.21) (0.08) (0.19) 
 
(0.44) (0.37) (0.44) 
 
(0.43) (0.11) (0.24) 
Cash 0.19 -0.18 0.28 
 
6.81*** 6.37*** -10.98*** 
 
-0.36 -0.42** 0.95** 
 
(0.35) (0.13) (0.30) 
 
(1.33) (1.38) (0.99) 
 
(0.90) (0.18) (0.37) 
Ln(Size) -0.78 -0.56* 2.44*** 
 
-0.94 -0.16 6.22*** 
 
0.72 -1.23*** 2.19*** 
 
(0.58) (0.34) (0.75) 
 
(0.91) (0.77) (2.42) 
 
(1.10) (0.41) (0.83) 
FX -2.50 -0.26 3.92** 
 
-4.68 1.43 17.54 
 
-5.93 0.32 1.75 
 
(1.89) (0.96) (1.90) 
 
(2.88) (2.26) (12.66) 
 
(3.94) (1.05) (2.22) 
GDP 2.34 -4.27 7.68 
 
10.16 -13.52* 25.12 
 
-3.16 -2.91 7.15 
 
(5.42) (3.78) (11.44) 
 
(7.51) (7.18) (19.13) 
 
(10.79) (3.05) (6.52) 
Market -1.29 0.45 0.55 
 
-1.26 2.50* -8.11* 
 
-2.43 -0.56 2.11 
 
(1.19) (0.65) (1.58) 
 
(1.74) (1.45) (4.36) 
 
(2.11) (0.60) (1.33) 
PE -0.01 0.00 0.02 
 
-0.05** 0.05** -0.03 
 
0.15** -0.09** 0.11** 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
 
(0.06) (0.03) (0.06) 
ROA 0.00 0.02* -0.04** 
 
0.01 0.01 -0.12*** 
 
0.15** 0.02 -0.10 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
 
(0.06) (0.03) (0.07) 
Bunkers -1.02*** 0.21 0.80** 
 
-1.44*** 0.68* 3.93*** 
 
-0.45 -0.02 0.23 
 
(0.34) (0.16) (0.32) 
 
(0.44) (0.37) (1.27) 
 
(0.70) (0.20) (0.36) 
Baltic Dry -0.59*** 0.34*** -0.09 
 
-0.80*** 0.94*** -1.24 
 
-0.54** 0.11 0.01 
 
(0.13) (0.10) (0.25) 
 
(0.26) (0.25) (0.96) 
 
(0.23) (0.10) (0.19) 
R2 0.11  0.33  0.16 
N 437   169   218 
a Marginal propensities to merge were evaluated with the independent variables each set at their median. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The significance levels at 
10%, 5% and 1% are denoted as *,**,*** respectively. 
